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Discarding the Hegemony of the Linguistic 
Signifier
Gilles Deleuze famously credits Charles Saunders 
Peirce with propagating the asignifying sign, which 
is not formed linguistically, but aesthetically and 
pragmatically ‘as a condition, anterior by right to 
what it conditions’.4 Félix Guattari draws the line 
between those who relate semiotics to the science 
of language à la Ferdinand de Saussure, and 
those who consider language as merely one of 
many instances of general semiotics.5 Semiotics, 
particularly in Europe, has generally followed de 
Saussure’s lead and paid more attention to ‘cultural’ 
than ‘natural’ signs. The move in the post-war 
period towards what Jacques Derrida simply called 
‘grammatology’ was marked by increasingly urgent 
meditations on writing. Roland Barthes, a crucial 
contributor to the debate on semiotics, heralds 
the crossing of the Atlantic of this French intellec-
tual discourse with his 1967 essay ‘The Death of 
the Author’, first published in America. Here, the 
removal of authority from the author turned scriptor, 
paralleling Julia Kristeva’s concept of intertextu-
ality, impacted architectural theory in America in a 
profound way.6
The contribution in this issue by Stella 
Baraklianou, ‘Moiré Effect: Index and the Digital 
Image’, identifies in Barthes’ analysis of the image 
‘a point where signification resists meaning, the 
index becomes void, and […] meaning is produced 
through the failure of language’. In his article enti-
tled ‘Information and Asignification’, Gary Genosko, 
But where does the idea that the socius is reducible to 
the facts of language, and that these facts are in turn 
reducible to linearizable and ‘digitalizable’ signifying 
chains, come from? (Guattari, 1986)1
To start on a personal note, we have recently 
witnessed a confession of a fellow architect with 
which we fully identify. We, too, belong to the 
generation educated under the semiotic regime, 
which – as we will argue in our introduction – has 
run its course. We also believe that the idea 
of ‘architecture as language’ might have been 
useful as an analytical tool but never as a design 
mechanism.2 After all, creativity comes first and 
routinisation follows. As the title of Footprint 14 
suggests, this is a general plea to have done with 
the hegemony of the linguistic signifier. Signifying 
semiotics is but a fraction of a much broader asigni-
fying semiotics. We propose to approach the issue 
qua a Spinozist practice of ethology, defined as the 
study of capacities, or – as we would like to think 
of it – a proto-theory of singularity. This is as much 
an ethical or political problem as it is an aesthetic 
one. It concerns what the cultural critic Steven 
Shaviro recently qualified as a primordial form of 
sentience that is non-intentional, non-correlational, 
and anoetic.3 The Affective Turn will be meas-
ured against the unavoidable Digital Turn. We will 
conclude by reversing the famous Wittgensteinian 
dictum whereby what we cannot speak about we 
must not pass over in silence. In the final paragraph 
of a politically charged epilogue, we reveal the pink-
on-pink reference.
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2Lazzarato’, Jay Hetrick also calls on this thought 
model made so clear by the image of the racehorse 
and the ox. In developing his argument on asigni-
fying semiotics through an analysis of Assemblage 
(Angela Melitopoulos’ 2010 video installation 
co-created with Maurizio Lazzarato), Hetrick identi-
fies the ‘machinic’ quality of the assemblage firstly 
in its ‘functional and pragmatic’ capacity to affect 
and be affected. This assemblage, much like the 
body in Spinoza, is developed in terms of ‘machinic 
animism’. The assemblage is further identified in 
terms of an ‘axiomatic set’; one which, following 
William James, can be seen as a ‘conjunctive and 
disjunctive’ set of relations.
A Spinozist Practice of Ethology
Central to Gregory Seigworth’s contribution is the 
work of François Laruelle, to whom, he points out, 
Deleuze and Guattari nod their heads in their final 
book What is Philosophy?. Seigworth’s under-
standing of the ‘non-’ (non-philosophy, non-science, 
non-thinking…) neither indicates a negation nor 
an opposition, but a relationship that configures 
and reconfigures both immanent and affective 
relations along the axis referred to as ‘body-mind-
world’. Baraklianou also points to Laruelle in her 
article. Here, Laurelle’s ‘non-photography’ is cited 
to indicate the capacity of photography to carry 
out reflexive operations. Baraklianou writes of 
Laurelle’s ‘theory of doublets, a coupling of duality 
and unity, the theory of one-to-one’. This one-to-
one, as Seigworth discusses it, is, for Laurelle, not 
the Spinozist ‘One-All’ but must be seen ‘[…] in the 
absolute singularity and solitude of the ordinary or 
generic human’. What is at stake here is no less 
than the materiality/incorporeality of the ‘real’. Citing 
Seigworth: ‘For Laurelle, the matter-ing/motor-ing of 
immanence provides an absolute stillness, a dense 
point of the tightest, most contracted infinity. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, the matter/motor of imma-
nence turns an infinite process, an all-at-once 
absolute expanse of survey without distance.’
through a nuanced reading of Guattari and Barthes, 
clearly articulates the difference between asignifying 
semiotics and signifying semiologies, while pointing 
to Barthes’ disavowal of ideology with respect to his 
concept ‘de-politicized speech’.
On the other hand, semiotics in the American 
context has provided the basis for a far more general 
enterprise, and a means of unifying the sciences of 
physics, biology and psychology. Peirce, the cham-
pion of general semiotics, treats it as a process. 
His signs are modes of sensation: the affect.7 In 
its appeal to common sense, representationalism 
or indirect realism is inherently conservative. It 
could be argued that its sole task is to tame and 
domesticate difference; that is, to make it subordi-
nate to identity.8 By contrast, if we treat identity as 
a derivative and not as a foundational concept, we 
effectively denounce phenomenology for elevating 
recognition and resemblance to the status of a 
basis of thought.9
The relative autonomy of the asignifying sign is 
paramount if we are to define a body neither by 
its form, nor by its organs or functions, but by its 
capacity for affecting and being affected in return.10 
Deleuze provides an example which at first seems 
counterintuitive and proves just how much we are 
accustomed to Aristotelian categorisation. There 
are greater differences between a racehorse and 
a workhorse than there are between an ox and a 
workhorse. This is because the racehorse and the 
workhorse do not share the same affects or the 
same capacity for being affected: the workhorse 
has more affects in common with the ox.11 Things 
are no longer defined by a qualitative essence, 
‘man as a reasonable animal’, but by a quantifiable 
power. The limit of something is the limit of its action 
and not the outline of its figure.
In his contribution to this issue, ‘Video 
Assemblages: “Machinic Animism” and “Asignifying 
Semiotics” in the Work of Melitopoulos and 
3Hybridising Real Virtual and the Actualised through 
Affective Medium Ecology’, Marc Boumeester, 
through a complex series of relational arguments, 
builds a compelling case for thinking of asignification 
in terms of ‘medium’ as opposed to ‘media’. Through 
notions akin to desire, yearning and unfulfilled-ness, 
Boumeester develops a double movement between 
information and sensation or, in line with Deleuze, 
what he identifies as the virtual and the sublime. 
On the other hand, in his ‘The Birthing of Things: 
Bergson as a Reader of Lucretius’, Patrick Healy 
examines the work of Henri Bergson on Lucretius 
and argues for its vital significance in understanding 
the development of Bergson’s philosophy of the 
virtual best, exemplified in the statement ‘the whole 
is never given’.
Gibson’s assertion that amodal (and ambulant) 
perception is a rule rather than an exception, paral-
lels Deleuze’s argument that every perception is, 
in fact, hallucinatory because it has no object.19 In 
the words of the radical empiricist William James: 
‘We were virtual knowers […] long before we were 
certified to have been actual knowers […].’20 If 
perception is, ipso facto, virtual, the Part to Whole 
relationship simply makes no sense. We need 
to supplant it with the relationship of Ordinary vs. 
Remarkable (Singular).21 The optical form does 
not remain invariant, but the form of the change of 
form is an invariant. A perceived event (whole) is 
not based on a static property such as form (part), 
but rather upon an invariant embedded in change 
(singularity). As Henri Bergson would have it, while 
parts are always in space, the (open) whole is in 
time.22 It comes as no surprise that Gibson turned 
his attention to (formless) invariants:
The terrestrial world is mostly made of surfaces, not 
of bodies in space. And these surfaces often flow or 
undergo stretching, squeezing, bending and breaking 
in ways of enormous mechanical complexity. So 
different, in fact, are environmental motions from 
those studied by Isaac Newton that it is best to think of 
It is in this context of immanence that we can also 
consider the legacy of the late American psycholo-
gist James Jerome Gibson, whose highly innovative 
concepts, developed over thirty years ago, continue 
to stir controversy even among scholars of the 
Ecological School of Perception. Gibson was well 
aware of the difficulties in challenging orthodoxies.12 
His neologism affordance, akin to the affect, is 
perhaps the most important for our purposes. It 
is a key concept in the ecological theory of direct 
perception with which Gibson challenges the infor-
mation-processing paradigm.13 Affordance is not 
merely a new term, but a new way of organising the 
logos. What this quintessential part-sign conveys 
is that a mode of existence never pre-exists an 
event.14 Hence Gibson:
An affordance is neither an objective property nor 
a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An 
affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-
objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. 
It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. 
An affordance points both ways, to the environment 
and to the observer.15
There is a striking parallel here with Deleuze, for 
whom concepts do not by any means constitute a 
set of universal coordinates that are given once and 
for all. They have no meaning other than to make 
the estimation of a continuous variation possible. It 
is never a matter of bringing all sorts of things under 
a single concept, but rather, relating each concept to 
the variables that explain its mutations.16 The all-too 
mechanicist relationship of One and Many has to 
be supplanted by the One-All machinic concept of 
non-totalisable multiplicity. By ‘machinic’, Deleuze 
and Guattari simply mean extra-linguistic forms of 
communication.17 According to them, ‘spatiotem-
poral relations, determinations are not predicates of 
the thing but dimensions of multiplicities’.18
In his contribution, ‘Medium Affect Desire: 
4Zeno’s paradox continues to haunt us.30 This is 
especially pertinent as we seem to be witnessing yet 
another major ‘paradigm shift’– the Digital Turn.31
This issue opens with a contribution by Genosko, 
which lays out the trajectory of thinking that first 
challenges the importance of ‘meaning’ in semantic 
content and semiotic systems. Genosko identifies 
the beginning of this discourse to around 1940 with 
the work of the information theorist Claude Shannon 
and his interest in both abstract and concrete math-
ematical machines. Genosko develops a critique of 
informatics and the coding of ‘signifying semiologies 
by asignifying semiotics (as) the growth of asignifi-
cation […]’ Through selected works by Guattari, he 
provides a reading of the non-discursive through 
the machinic and ‘[…] non-human assemblages of 
proto-enunciation’.
The current Digital Turn could be seen as both 
a blessing and a curse. It certainly endows the 
architect with ever more powerful tools, not just for 
mapping and designing, but also for literally (not 
literarily) expanding our sensorium.32 An expan-
sion of the range of action/perception capacitates 
the body. But there are also worrisome indications 
that the Digital Turn perpetuates the unfortunate 
structuralist habit of putting the cart of represen-
tation before the horse of morphogenesis.33 In his 
contribution ‘How to Think Constructivism? Ruskin, 
Spuybroek and Deleuze on Gothic Architecture’, 
Piotrek Swiatkowski counters this tendency by 
reference to (neo)vitalist ontology. It is quite plau-
sible – despite all the evidence to the contrary – that 
the twenty-first century will have to break with 
abstract concreteness (rationality) and recover the 
richness of concrete abstraction (pan-empiricism). 
The proposal is not to be taken lightly in an era of 
privatising profits and socialising losses. As Deleuze 
remarks in an interview with Toni Negri:
[W]hat we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve 
quite lost the world, it’s been taken from us. If you 
them as changes of structure rather than changes of 
position of elementary bodies, changes in form, rather 
than of point locations, or changes in the layout rather 
than motions in the usual meaning of the term.23
Digital Turn
As we see it, the problem with the predominant (i.e. 
linguistic) conceptions of experience is not that they 
are too abstract, but rather that they are not abstract 
enough.24 We seem to be lacking a genuine theory 
of the concrete abstractness of experience. As 
the process philosopher Albert North Whitehead 
cautions, a fact in nature has nothing to do with 
the logical derivation of concepts.25 It is therefore 
high time to shake off the pernicious residue of the 
Linguistic Turn.26 In the words of the late architec-
tural theorist Robin Evans: ‘Drawing is not writing 
and architecture does not speak.’27 As Gibson aptly 
said, one cannot hope to understand natural stimuli 
by analogy with socially coded stimuli:
The world does not speak to the observer. Animals 
and humans communicate with cries, gestures, 
speech, pictures, writing, and television [and internet], 
but we cannot hope to understand perception in terms 
of these channels; it is quite the other way around. 
Words and pictures convey information, carry it, or 
transmit it, but the information in the sea of energy 
around each of us, luminous or mechanical or chem-
ical energy, is not conveyed. It is simply there. The 
assumption that information can be transmitted and 
the assumption that it can be stored are appropriate 
for the theory of communication, not for the theory of 
perception.28
To try to capture the non-discursive (eventful) 
through what is, in terms of evolution, either a fairly 
recent graft of linguistic theories, or the more current 
input/output information processing, is certainly 
appealing. Yet it is impossible, not least because 
there is no structural homology between the (contin-
uous) analogue and the (discrete) digital.29 Strictly 
speaking, there are no digital events in nature. 
5is the (open) whole:
Each stroke of the axe is modified or corrected, 
according to the shape of the cut face of the tree left by 
the previous stroke. This self-corrective […] process 
is brought about by a total system, tree-eyes-brain-
muscles-axe-stroke-tree; and it is this total system 
that has the characteristics of immanent mind. More 
correctly, we should spell the matter out as: (differ-
ences in tree) - (differences in retina) - (differences 
in brain) - (differences in muscles) - (differences in 
movement of axe) - (differences in tree), etc. What is 
transmitted around the circuit is transforms of differ-
ences. And, as noted above, a difference which makes 
a difference is an idea or unit of information.35
The Proustian apprenticeship in asignifying semi-
otics taught us that there are two ways to miss 
the sense of a sign: objectivism and subjectivism. 
The former characterises the belief that sense can 
be found in the object emitting the sign, while the 
latter finds sense within, in ‘chains of association’ 
(the subject). In contrast to phenomenology, where 
the problem of the construction of signs becomes 
a problem of ‘bestowal of meaning’, in Deleuze’s 
account it is sense that is productive of signs and 
their meanings.36 This distinction between sense 
and meaning is not purely academic nitpicking, as 
the feminist philosopher Claire Colebrook cautions: 
‘Sense is that orientation or potential that allows for 
the genesis of bodies but that always, if extended, 
would destroy the bordered organism.’37 This in 
turn means that we do not look on and grasp a 
specific aspect of the world as detached and fully 
formed beings: ‘[A] being is what it is because 
it is already an expression of every aspect of the 
whole. […] Organisms are possible because they 
concretely embody potentialities – the power to eat, 
to see, to move, to think – that could have been 
actualized differently, and that can even be counter-
actualized.’38 According to Colebrook, a (fully) 
bounded organism is but an organicist fantasy. So 
is bounded architecture, and that is why it would 
believe in the world you precipitate events, however 
inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new 
space-times, however small their surface or volume.34
What We Cannot Speak about 
We Must Not Pass Over in Silence
In contemporary readings of Spinoza on bodies and 
their capacity to affect and be affected, we agree 
with Deleuze that it is necessary to understand 
that there are many bodies: individual, collective, 
mystical, corporate, institutional, animal, even the 
body of the world and the heavens. And so there is 
a kind of indetermination and non-sense required 
for there to be thought processes of ‘deterritoriali-
sation’ or ‘lines of flight’: symptoms, not codes, nor 
‘spaces of affect’ understood in contrast to ‘effecting 
space’. Seigworth, in his paper ‘Affect Theory 
as Pedagogy of the “Non-”’, points to Deleuze’s 
reading of Spinoza’s immanence as a ‘third knowl-
edge (following ‘affectio’ or the capacity to affect 
and be affected as first knowledge, and common 
notions of relations [affectus] as the second)’. 
Referring to Guattari, Seigworth identifies the differ-
ence between ‘sensory’ and ‘problematic’ affect: 
the former arrives at the inside of being, the latter 
outside it. Citing Guattari: ‘affect’s spatio-temporal 
congruence dissolves and its elucidating proce-
dures threaten to fly off in all directions.’
Experience is a single plane of immanence that 
fully integrates both subject and object, or as James 
would have it, there is no knower and known, there 
is only experience. Consequently, Truth and Falsity 
cannot be considered as values which exist outside 
the constitutive problematic fields that endow them 
with sense (Problem). This also marks the differ-
ence between detached interpretation and hands-on 
intervention. Consider Gregory Bateson’s example 
of a man felling a tree with an axe. An average 
Westerner would say ‘I cut down the tree’ strongly 
believing that there is a delimited agent (self) which 
performed a ‘purposive’ action (cutting) upon a 
delimited object (tree) What he fails to apprehend 
6and invites us to enter the field of subjective 
economy.45 This politico-libidinal approach reso-
nates with the feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti’s 
anti-messianic call to ‘operate from the belly of the 
beast’.46 The notion of asignifying semiotics, which 
plays a dominant role in contemporary capitalism, 
turns out to be indispensable in creating the very 
conditions for its political critique. It is not limited to 
the semiotics of mathematics, stock indices, money, 
accounting and computer codes, but includes the 
semiotics of music, art, architecture, cinematog-
raphy, dance, and so on. What they all have in 
common is their repudiation of the hegemony of 
meta-languages. In contrast to the cardologic, 
they are non-representative, non-illustrative and 
non-narrative.47 The assemblage is powered and 
amplified by the ordologic asignifying semiotics 
which works within it. If in representationalism a 
signifier functions in the logic of discursive aggre-
gates, then in asignification it functions in the 
‘machinic of bodies without organs’.48
In their contributions to this issue, both Genosko 
and Hetrick employ the work of Lazzarato in devel-
oping arguments on what has recently come to 
be discussed under the term ‘semiocapitalism’. In 
the case of Hetrick, this is achieved by reference 
to Lazzarato’s machinic devices and the effects 
of immaterial labour on the proto-subjective and 
autopoietic haecceities. With Genosko, semi-
ocapitalism is also identified through immaterial 
labour and the ‘seizing effect’ this has on individual 
freedom.
The autonomy of the asignifying sign is paramount 
if a body – psyche, socius and environment – is to 
be defined, not by its form or by its organs and func-
tions, but by its affect; that is to say, its capacity 
for affecting or being affected.49 In asignifying 
semiotics, signs work directly on material flows. 
They are not powerless as in signifying semiotics 
because their performance does not depend on the 
mediation (translation) of signification, denotation, 
make more sense to treat it as a (semi-permeable) 
membrane(s) or in terms of zones and thresholds.39 
In his celebrated Cyclonopedia, the speculative 
realist Reza Negarestani explains why closure (of 
any system or subject) is impossible and why the 
effectuation of this impossibility is always cata-
strophically unpleasant for the subject:
You can erect yourself as a solid and molar volume, 
tightening boundaries around yourself, securing your 
horizon, sealing yourself off from any vulnerability […] 
immersing yourself deeper into your human hygiene 
and becoming vigilant against outsiders. Through this 
excessive paranoia, rigorous closure and survivalist 
vigilance, one becomes an ideal prey for the radical 
outside and its forces.40
To conclude, experience is never of something, it 
is something and, as such, irreducible to what we 
call lived experience. The main consequence of 
such a revelation, according to Evans, is that goal-
oriented human action cannot in any serious way 
be used as a design criterion because ‘freedom of 
action is never a de facto established condition but 
always a nascent possibility’.41 Put differently, not 
all potentiality is an accrued value. Consequently, 
the part-sign is antecedent to the signifying sign and 
not the other way around.42 This discovery sheds 
new light on the role of theory.43 To put it succinctly, 
meaning is not a matter of propositional logic, but of 
action.44 To avoid any misunderstandings, the signi-
fying sign is just not abstract enough. In the 1960s, 
the American artist Barnett Newman declared 
that: ‘Aesthetics is for art what ornithology is for 
birds.’ By analogy – and in the face of performative 
paradox – we want to conclude by proposing that 
architecture will cope just as well – if not better – in 
ignorance of linguistics.
Epilogue
In a recent paper, the sociologist and philosopher 
Maurizio Lazzarato cautions against limiting the 
attention of scholarly research to political economy, 
7given that, as Sven-Olov Wallenstein cautions, 
we have to remain at the same level of advance-
ment as the most advanced capitalism.56 It is a risk 
worth taking, even if our ‘critique’ seems to become 
inseparable from its target (the beast). Deleuze and 
Guattari’s principle of asignifying rupture calls for 
relinquishing the tautological, and hence the trivial 
effort of tracing, in favour of creative mapping of this 
kind:
The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces 
nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this 
is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that 
it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes 
its rupture, its own line of flight, follows its “aparallel 
evolution” through to the end.57
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